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ABSTRACT
A standard proposition in open-economy macroeconomics is that a central-bank-engineered
increase in the real interest rate makes domestic government debt more attractive and leads to a real
appreciation. If, however, the increase in the real interest rate also increases the probability of
default on the debt, the effect may be instead to make domestic government debt less attractive, and
to lead to a real depreciation. That outcome is more likely the higher the initial level of debt, the
higher the proportion of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and the higher the price of risk.  
Under that outcome, inflation targeting can clearly have perverse effects: An increase in the
real interest in response to higher inflation leads to a real depreciation. The real depreciation leads
in turn to a further increase in inflation. In this case, fiscal policy, not monetary policy, is the right
instrument to decrease inflation.  
This paper argues that this is the situation the Brazilian economy found itself in in 2002 and
2003. It presents a model of the interaction between the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the
probability of default, in a high-debt high-risk-aversion economy such as Brazil during that period.
It then estimates the model, using Brazilian data. It concludes that, in 2002, the level and the
composition of public debt in Brazil, and the general level of risk aversion in world financial









A standard proposition in open-economy macroeconomics is that a central-bank-
engineered increase in the real interest rate makes domestic government debt more
attractive and leads to a real appreciation. If, however, the increase in the real
interest rate also increases the probability of default on the debt, the e®ect may
be instead to make domestic government debt less attractive, and to lead to a real
depreciation. That outcome is more likely the higher the initial level of debt, the
higher the proportion of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and the higher the
price of risk.
Under that outcome, in°ation targeting can clearly have perverse e®ects: An in-
crease in the real interest in response to higher in°ation leads to a real depreciation.
The real depreciation leads in turn to a further increase in in°ation. In this case,
¯scal policy, not monetary policy, is the right instrument to decrease in°ation.
This paper argues that this is the situation the Brazilian economy found itself in
in 2002 and 2003.
In 2002, the increasing probability that the left-wing candidate, Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva, would be elected, led to an acute macroeconomic crisis in Brazil. The rate
of interest on Brazilian government dollar-denominated debt increased sharply,
re°ecting an increase in the market's assessment of the probability of default on
the debt. The Brazilian currency, the Real, depreciated sharply against the dollar.
The depreciation led in turn to an increase in in°ation.
In October 2002, Lula was indeed elected. Over the following months, his commit-
ment to a high target for the primary surplus, together with the announcement
of a reform of the retirement system, convinced ¯nancial markets that the ¯scal
outlook was better than they had feared. This in turn led to a decrease in the
perceived probability of default, an appreciation of the Real, and a decrease in
in°ation. In many ways, 2003 looked like 2002 in reverse.
While the immediate danger has passed, there are general lessons to be learned.
One of them has to do with the conduct of monetary policy in such an environment.Brazil 4
Despite its commitment to in°ation targeting, and an increase in in°ation from
mid-2002 on, the Brazilian Central Bank did not increase the real interest rate
until the beginning of 2003. Should it have? The answer given in the paper is that
it should not have. In such an environment, the increase in real interest rates would
probably have been perverse, leading to an increase in the probability of default,
to further depreciation, and to an increase in in°ation. The right instrument to
decrease in°ation was ¯scal policy, and in the end, this is the instrument which
was used.
The theme of ¯scal dominance of monetary policy is an old theme, running in
the modern literature from Sargent and Wallace [1981] \unpleasant arithmetic" to
Woodford's \¯scal theory of the price level" [2003] (with an application of Wood-
ford's theory to Brazil by Loyo [1999].) The contribution of this paper is to focus
on a speci¯c incarnation, to show its empirical relevance, and to draw its implica-
tions for monetary policy in general, and for in°ation targeting in particular. The
paper has two sections:
Section 1 formalizes the interaction between the interest rate, the exchange rate,
and the probability of default, in a high-debt, high-risk-aversion economy such as
Brazil in 2002-2003.
Section 2 estimates the model using Brazilian data. It concludes that, in 2002, the
level and the composition of Brazilian debt, together with the general level of risk
aversion in world ¯nancial markets, were indeed such as to imply perverse e®ects
of the interest rate on the exchange rate and on in°ation.
1 A simple model
In standard open economy models, a central-bank-engineered increase in the real
interest rate leads to a decrease in in°ation through two channels. First, the higher
real interest rate decreases aggregate demand, output, and in turn, in°ation. Sec-
ond, the higher real interest rate leads to a real appreciation. The appreciation thenBrazil 5
decreases in°ation, both directly, and indirectly through the induced decrease in
aggregate demand and output.
The question raised by the experience of Brazil in 2002 and 2003 is about the sign
of the second channel. It is whether and when, once one takes into account the
e®ects of the real interest rate on the probability of default on government debt, an
increase in the real interest rate may lead, instead, to a real depreciation. This is
the question taken up in this model, and in the empirical work which follows. The
answer is clearly only part of what we need to know to assess the overall e®ects of
monetary policy, but it is a crucial part of it. A discussion of the implications of
the ¯ndings for overall monetary policy is left to the conclusion of the paper.
The model is a one-period model. The economy has (at least) three ¯nancial assets:
² A one-period bond, free of default risk, with nominal rate of return i.
In°ation, ¼, will be known with certainty in the model so there is no need
to distinguish between expected and actual in°ation, and the real rate of
return r on the bond (in terms of Brazilian goods) is given by:
(1 + r) ´
1 + i
1 + ¼
I shall think of r as the rate controlled by the central bank (the model
equivalent of the Selic in Brazil).
² A one-period government bond denominated in domestic currency (Reals),
with stated nominal rate of return in Reals of iR.
Conditional on no default, the real rate of return on this bond, rR, is given
by:
(1 + rR) ´
1 + iR
1 + ¼
Let p be the probability of default on government debt (default is assumed
to be full, leading to the loss of principal and interest). Taking into accountBrazil 6
the probability of default, the expected real rate of return on this bond is
given by:
(1 ¡ p)(1 + rR)
² A one-period government bond denominated in foreign currency (dollars),
with stated nominal rate of return in dollars of i$.
Conditional on no default, the real rate of return (in terms of U.S. goods)
on this bond, r$, is given by:
(1 + r$) ´
1 + i$
1 + ¼¤
where stars denote foreign variables, so ¼¤ is foreign (U.S.) in°ation.
Conditional on no default, the gross real rate of return in terms of Brazilian




where ² denotes the real exchange rate, and primes denote next-period vari-
ables.
Taking into account the probability of default, the gross expected real rate





1.1 Equilibrium rates of return
We need a theory for the determination of rR and r$ given r. I shall stay short of
a full characterization of portfolio choices by domestic and foreign residents, and
simply assume that both risky assets carry a risk premium over the riskless rate,Brazil 7
so their expected return is given by:





(1 + r$) = (1 + r) + µp (2)
Both assets are subject to the same risk, and so carry the same risk premium.
The parameter µ re°ects the average degree of risk aversion in the market. The
probability of default p proxies for the variance of the return. For empirically
relevant, values of p, the variance is roughly linear in p, and using p simpli¯es the
algebra below.1
Note the two roles of the probability of default in determining the stated rate
on government debt. First, a higher stated rate is required to deliver the same
expected rate of return; this is captured by the term (1 ¡ p) on the left in both
equations. Second, if investors are risk averse, a higher expected rate of return is
required to compensate them for the risk; this is captured by the term µp on the
right in both equations.
1.2 Capital °ows and trade balance
The next step is to determine the e®ect of the probability of default, p, and of the
real interest rate, r, on the real exchange rate, ². To do so requires looking at the
determinants of capital °ows.
Let the nominal interest rate on U.S. bonds be i¤, so the gross expected real rate
of return (in terms of U.S. goods) on these bonds is (1 + r¤) ´ (1 + i¤)=(1 + ¼¤).
Assume foreign investors are risk averse, and choose between Brazilian dollar bonds
and U.S. government dollar bonds, so capital °ows are given by:
1. The variance is given by V ´ p(1¡p)(1 + r
R)
2
. So, using equation (1) with pV replacing pµ,
the variance is implicitly de¯ned by V (1 ¡ p) = p((1 + r) + µV )
2, and depends on p;r and µ. For





(1 ¡ p)(1 + r$) ¡
²0
²
(1 + r¤) ¡ µ¤p
¶
C0 > 0
The ¯rst two terms are the expected rates of return on Brazilian and U.S. dollar
bonds respectively, both expressed in terms of Brazilian goods. The third term
re°ects the adjustment for risk on Brazilian dollar bonds: The parameter µ¤ re°ects
the risk aversion of foreign investors, and p proxies, as before, for the variance of
the return on Brazilian dollar bonds. The higher the expected return on Brazilian
dollar bonds, or the lower the expected return on U.S. dollar bonds, or the lower
the risk on Brazilian bonds, the larger the capital in°ows.
Using the arbitrage equation between risk-free domestic bonds and domestic dollar
bonds derived earlier, the expression for capital °ows can be rewritten as:
CF = C
µ
(1 + r) ¡
²0
²
(1 + r¤) + (µ ¡ µ¤)p
¶
Whether an increase in the probability of default leads to a decrease in capital °ows
depends therefore on (µ¡µ¤), the di®erence between average risk aversion and the
risk aversion of foreign investors. If the two were the same, then the increased
probability of default would be re°ected in the equilibrium rate of return, and
foreign investors would have no reason to reduce their holdings. The relevant case
appears to be however the case where µ¤ > µ, where foreign investors have higher
risk aversion than the market, so an increase in risk leads both to an increase in
the stated rate and to capital out°ows. This is the assumption I shall make here.
A simple way of capturing this is to assume that µ and µ¤ satisfy:
µ = ¸µ¤; ¸ · 1 (3)
so the the average risk aversion in the market increases less than one for one with
the foreign investors' risk aversion.2 Under that assumption, capital °ows are given




(1 + r) ¡
²0
²
(1 + r¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)µ¤p
¶
Turn now to net exports. Assume net exports to be a function of the real exchange
rate:
NX = N(²) N0 > 0
Then, the equilibrium condition that the sum of capital °ows and net exports be
equal to zero gives:
C
µ
(1 + r) ¡
²0
²
(1 + r¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)µ¤p
¶
+ N(²) = 0
In a dynamic model, ²0 would be endogenously determined. In this one-period
model, a simple way to proceed is as follows. Normalize the long run equilibrium
exchange rate (equivalently the pre{shock exchange rate) to be equal to one. Then
assume:
²0 = ²´
with ´ between zero and one. The closer ´ is to one, the more the future exchange
rate moves with the current exchange rate, and by implication the larger the real
depreciation needed to achieve a given increase in capital °ows.
Replacing ²0 in the previous equation gives us the ¯rst of the two relations between
in risk aversion on the part of foreign investors, or other factors (factors generally referred to as
\liquidity") is not important here (for an approach based on liquidity shocks, see for example
Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2002].) All these can be captured by changes in µ
¤. What is
important is that these shifts a®ect foreign investors more than the average investor in the market.Brazil 10
² and p we shall need below:
C
³
(1 + r) ¡ ²´¡1(1 + r¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)µ¤p
´
+ N(²) = 0 (4)
This ¯rst relation between the exchange rate and the probability of default is
plotted in Figure 1.
An increase in the probability of default increases risk. This increase in risk leads to
an increase in the exchange rate|to a depreciation: The locus is upward-sloping.3
The slope depends in particular on the degree of risk aversion, µ¤. Two loci are
drawn in the ¯gure: The °atter one corresponds to low risk aversion; the steeper
one corresponds to high risk aversion.
For a given probability of default, an increase in the interest rate leads to a decrease
in the exchange rate, to an appreciation|the standard channel through which
monetary policy a®ects the exchange rate. To a ¯rst approximation, the vertical
shift in the locus does not depend on risk aversion. The two dotted lines show the
e®ects of an increase in the interest rate on the equilibrium locus.
[Figure 1. The exchange rate as a function of the probability of default.]
1.3 Debt dynamics and default risk
The next step is to determine the e®ect of the real exchange rate, ², and the
interest rate, r, back on the probability of default, p. This requires us to look at
debt dynamics.
Assume the government ¯nances itself by issuing the two types of bonds we have
described earlier, some in Real, some in dollars, both subject to default risk.
3. If C(:) and N(:) are linear, then the locus is convex. I draw it as convex, but the results below
do not depend on convexity.p




Figure 1.  Exchange rate as  a function of default riskBrazil 11
Denote by D$ the amount of dollar-denominated debt (measured in U.S. goods)
at the start of the period. Given the current real exchange rate ², the current
real value (in Brazilian goods) of this dollar debt is D$². Absent default, the real
value (again, in Brazilian goods) of the dollar debt at the start of next-period is
(D$(1 + r$)²0).
Denote by DR the amount of Real-denominated debt (measured in Brazilian
goods) at the start of the period. Then, absent default, the real value of this
Real-denominated debt at the start of next period is DR(1 + rR).
Conditional on no-default, debt at the start of next period is thus given by:
D0 = D$(1 + r$)²0 + DR(1 + rR) ¡ X
where X is the primary surplus.
Using equations (1) and (2) to eliminate (1 + r$) and (1 + rR), and equation (3)












For convenience (so we can discuss composition versus level e®ects of the debt),
de¯ne ¹ as the proportion of dollar debt in total debt at the equilibrium long-
run exchange rate (normalized earlier to be equal to one), so ¹ ´ D$=D, where







) [ ¹² + (1 ¡ ¹)] D ¡ X
A higher probability of default a®ects next-period debt through two channels: It
leads to a higher stated rate of return on debt so as to maintain the same expected
rate of return; this e®ect is captured through 1=(1 ¡ p). And, if risk aversion isBrazil 12
positive, the higher risk leads to a higher required expected rate of return; this
e®ect is captured through ¸µ¤p.
The last step is to relate the probability of default to the level of debt next period.
If we think of the probability of default as the probability that debt exceeds some
(stochastic) threshold, then we can write:
p = Ã(D0) Ã0 > 0
and we can think of the function Ã(:) as a cumulative probability distribution, low
and nearly °at for low values of debt, increasing rapidly as debt enters a critical
zone, and then °at again and close to one as debt becomes very high.
Putting the last two equations together gives us the second relation between the









) [ ¹² + (1 ¡ ¹)] D ¡ X
¶
(5)
Note that p depends on itself in a complicated, non linear fashion. To explore this
relation, Figure 2 plots the right- and the left-hand sides of the previous equation,
with p on the horizontal axis, and both p and Ã(:) on the vertical axis, for given
values of the other variables, including the exchange rate. The left hand side, p, as
a function of p, is given by the 45 degree line. The shape of Ã as a function of p
depends on whether the underlying distribution has in¯nite or ¯nite support.
[Figure 2. The probability of default as a function of itself]
² If it has in¯nite support, then the shape of Ã is as shown by the locus AA".
For any level of debt, there is a positive probability of default, however










Figure 2.  p and Ψ as functions of pBrazil 13
so does Ã. As p tends to one, 1=(1 ¡ p) tends to in¯nity, so does D0, and Ã
tends to one.
² If it has ¯nite support, then the shape of Ã is as shown by the locus OA'A".
In this case, there is a critical value of next-period debt below which the
probability of default is zero. So long as initial debt, the interest rate, and
the primary surplus are such that next-period debt remains below this crit-
ical value, increases in p do not increase Ã, which remains equal to 0. For
some value of p, the probability of default becomes positive. And, as before,
as p tends to one, Ã tends to one.
This implies that there are typically three equilibria (B, C and A" in the case of
in¯nite support, and O, C' and A" in the case of ¯nite support.) (If debt is high
enough, there may be no equilibrium except p = 1; I leave this standard case of
credit rationing aside here.) Standard comparative statics arguments eliminate the
middle equilibrium (C or C'). The equilibrium with p = 1 is present in any model
and is uninteresting. I shall assume in what follows that the relevant equilibrium
is the lower equilibrium (O or B) and that such an equilibrium exists. Under this
assumption, we can draw the relation between p and ² implied by equation (5).
If there is no dollar debt (¹ = 0), then the locus is horizontal: p may be positive
but is independent of the exchange rate.
If there is dollar debt, then the locus is either °at (if the support is ¯nite, and
the exchange rate is such that next-period debt remains below the critical level),
or upward-sloping (if the exchange rate is such that the probability of default
becomes positive.) If it is upward-sloping, its slope is an increasing function of the
proportion of dollar debt, and an increasing function of total initial debt. Figure
3 shows two loci, one with a °at segment, corresponding to low initial debt, the
other upward-sloping and steeper, corresponding to higher initial debt.
The e®ect of an increase in the interest rate is then either to leave the probability
of default unchanged (if next-period debt remains below the critical level), or to
increase the probability of default. The e®ect is again stronger the higher the initialBrazil 14
level of debt. Figure 3 shows the e®ects of an increase in the interest rate on each
of the two loci.
[Figure 3. The probability of default as a function of the exchange rate.]
1.4 The e®ects of the interest rate on default risk and the real
exchange rate
To summarize: The economy is characterized by two equations in p and ², for given
values of monetary and ¯scal policies, r;r¤;D;X and given parameters ´;µ¤;¹;¸:
C
³
(1 + r) ¡ ²´¡1(1 + r¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)µ¤p
´









) [ ¹² + (1 ¡ ¹))] D ¡ X
¶
(7)
For lack of better names, call the ¯rst the \capital °ow" relation, and the second
the \default risk" relation.
The question we want to answer is: Under what conditions will an increase in the
interest rate lead to a depreciation rather than to an appreciation?
From the two equations, the answer is straightforward: The higher the level of the
initial debt, or the higher the degree of risk aversion of foreign investors, or the
higher the proportion of dollar debt in total government debt, then the more likely
it is that an increase in the interest rate will lead to a depreciation rather than an
appreciation of the exchange rate.
This is shown in the three panels of Figure 4:





Figure 3.  Default risk as a function of the exchange rate and the interest rate.  Brazil 15
² Figure 4a looks at the case where the government has no dollar debt out-
standing, so the probability of default is independent of the real exchange
rate, and the default risk locus is vertical (it was horizontal in Figure 3, but
the axes are reversed here). It shows the equilibrium for two di®erent levels
of debt, and thus two di®erent probabilities of default. From Figure 1, the
capital °ow locus is upward-sloping. The equilibrium for low debt is at A,
the equilibrium for high debt is at B.
In this case, an increase in the interest rate shifts the capital °ow locus down:
A higher interest rate leads to a lower exchange rate. It shifts the default
risk locus to the right: A higher interest rate increases the probability of
default. The size of the shift is proportional to the initial level of debt. So the
larger the initial debt, the more likely it is that the increase in the interest
rate leads to a depreciation. As drawn, at low debt, the equilibrium goes
from A to A', and there is an appreciation; at high debt, the equilibrium
goes from B to B', and there is a depreciation.
² Figure 4b still looks at the case where the government has no dollar debt
outstanding and the default risk locus is vertical. It shows the equilibrium
for two di®erent values of risk aversion, and thus two di®erent slopes of the
capital °ow locus. In response to an increase in the interest rate, the capital
°ow locus shifts down; the size of the shift is approximately independent of
the degree of risk aversion.
So, under low risk aversion, the equilibrium goes from A to A', with an
appreciation. Under high risk aversion, the equilibrium goes from B to B',
with a depreciation. Again, in this second case, the indirect e®ect of the
interest rate, through the increase in the probability of default, and the
e®ect on capital °ows, dominates the direct e®ect of the interest rate on the
exchange rate.
² Figure 4c compares two cases, one in which the proportion of dollar debt, ¹
is equal to zero, and one in which ¹ is high. The equilibrium for low dollar
debt is at A, the equilibrium for high dollar debt is at B.p
ε





















Zero dollar debtBrazil 16
An increase in the interest rate shifts the capital °ow locus down. It shifts
the default risk locus to the right, and the shift is roughly independent of
the value of ¹. For the low value of ¹, the equilibrium moves from A to A',
with an appreciation. But for a high value of ¹, the equilibrium moves from
B to B', with a depreciation.4
In short: high debt, high risk aversion on the part of foreign investors, or a high
proportion of dollar debt can each lead to a depreciation in response to an increase
in the interest rate.
All these factors were indeed present in Brazil in 2002. The next question is thus
to get a sense of magnitudes. This is what we do in the next section.
2 A look at the empirical evidence
The purpose of this section is to look at the evidence using the model as a guide.
More speci¯cally, I estimate the two relations between the exchange rate and the
probability of default suggested by the model, and look at whether, in conditions
such as those faced by Brazil in 2002, an increase in the interest rate is likely to
lead to an appreciation or, instead, to a depreciation.5
The ¯rst step must be to obtain a time series for the probability of default, p. We
can then turn to the estimation of the two basic equations.
2.1 From the EMBI spread to the probability of default
A standard measure of the probability of default is the EMBI spread, the di®erence
between the stated rate of return on Brazilian dollar-denominated and U.S. dollar-
4. In this case, the convexity and concavity of the two loci suggest the potential existence of
another equilibrium with higher p and ². I have not looked at the conditions under which such an
equilibrium exists or not. I suspect that, again, if it does, it has unappealing comparative statics
properties.
5. For readers wanting more background, two useful descriptions and analyses of events in 2002
and 2003 are given by Pastore and Pinotti [2003] and Cardoso [2004]. For an insightful analysis
of the mood and the actions of foreign investors, see Santiso [2004].Brazil 17
denominated government bonds of the same maturity. But, clearly, the EMBI
spread re°ects not only the probability of default, but also the risk aversion of
foreign investors. And we know that their degree of risk aversion (or its inverse,
their \risk appetite") varies substantially over time. The question is whether we
can separate the two and estimate a time series for the probability of default.





[(1 ¡ p)(1 + r$) ¡ (1 + r¤)] ¡ µ¤p
¶
= ¡N(²))
Invert C(:) and reorganize to get:





De¯ne the Brazil spread as:6
S ´ 1 ¡
1 + r¤
1 + r$ =
r$ ¡ r¤
1 + r$
The previous equation can then be rewritten to give a relation between the spread,
the probability of default, and the exchange rate:















The interpretation of equation (8) is straightforward: Suppose investors were risk
neutral, so µ¤ = 0 and C0 = 1. Then S = p: The spread (as de¯ned above, not the
conventional EMBI spread itself) would simply give the probability of default|the
¯rst term on the right. If investors are risk averse however, then two more terms
appear. First, on average, investors require a risk premium for holding Brazilian
6. This de¯nition turns out to be more convenient than the conventional EMBI spread. For
empirically relevant values of r
$, the two move closely together.Brazil 18
dollar-denominated bonds. This risk premium is given by the second term on the
right. Second, as the demand for Brazilian dollar-denominated bonds is downward-
sloping, the rate of return on these bonds must be such as to generate capital °ows
equal to the trade de¯cit. This is captured by the third term on the right. If capital
°ows are very elastic, then changes in the rate of return required to generate capital
°ows are small, and this third term is small.
We can now turn to the econometrics.
A good semi-log approximation to equation (8), if µ¤ and p are not too large, is
given by:
logS = logp + aµ¤ + u
where a = 1=(1 + r$), and u is equal to the last term in equation (8) divided by
1 + C¡1(:)=(1 + r$).
² We clearly do not observe µ¤, but a number of economists have suggested
that a good proxy for µ¤ is the Baa spread, i.e the di®erence between the
yield on U.S. Baa bonds and U.S. T-bonds of similar maturities. (In other
words, their argument is that most of the movements in the Baa spread
re°ect movements in risk aversion, rather than movements in the probability
of default on Baa bonds). If we assume that the Baa spread is linear in µ¤,
this suggests running the following regression:
logS = c + b Baa spread + residual
and recovering the probability of default as the exponential value of c plus
the residual. This however raises two issues:
² First, the residual gives us at best (logp + u), not (logp). Approximating
the log probability in this way will thus be approximately correct only if
u is small relative to changes in probability. This will in turn be true ifBrazil 19
capital °ows are relatively elastic. As I see no simple way out, I shall again
maintain this assumption.
² Second, the estimate of b, and by implication, the estimate of (logp) will
be unbiased only if the Baa spread and the residual are uncorrelated. This
is unlikely to be true. Recall that the residual includes the log of the prob-
ability of default. As we have seen in the model earlier, an increase in risk
aversion, which increases the Baa spread, is also likely to increase the prob-
ability of default. Again, I see no simple way out, no obvious instrument.
As the e®ect of risk aversion on the probability of default is non linear how-
ever, and likely to be most relevant when µ¤ (and so, by implication, the
Baa spread) is high, this suggests estimating the relation over subsamples
with a relatively low value of the Baa spread. I shall do this below.
Table 1. Estimating the probability of default.
Sample ^ b (t-stat) DW ½ R2
OLS 1995:2 2004:1 0.37 (9.5) 0.34 0.46
AR1 1995:2 2004:1 0.31 (3.6) 0.84 0.89
AR1 Baa spread < 3.0% 0.16 (1.7) 0.85 0.89
AR1 Baa spread < 2.5% 0.15 (0.9) 0.88 0.90
Table 1 reports the results of regressions of the log spread on the Baa spread, using
monthly data. All data here and below, unless otherwise noted, are monthly aver-
ages. The spread is de¯ned as described above, based on the spread of the Brazilian
C{bond over the corresponding T-bond rate. The Baa spread is constructed as the
di®erence between the rate on Baa bonds and the 10-year Treasury bond rate.
The ¯rst line reports OLS results for the longest available sample, 1995:2 to 2004:1.
The estimated coe±cient ^ b is equal to 0.37. The change in exchange and monetary
regimes which took place at the start of 1999, with a shift from crawling peg toBrazil 20
°oating rates and in°ation targeting, raises the issue of subsample stability: One
might expect this regime change to have modi¯ed the relation of the Brazil spread
to the Baa spread; results using the smaller sample 1999:1 to 2004:1 give however
a nearly identical estimate for b, so I keep the longer sample.
The second line shows the results of AR(1) estimation. The estimated coe±cient
^ b is nearly identical. With simultaneity bias in mind, the next two lines look at
two subsamples. The ¯rst eliminates all months for which the Baa spread is above
3.0%; this removes all observations from 2001:9 to 2001:11, and from 2002:6 to
2003:3. The second eliminates all months for which the Baa spread is above 2.5%;
this removes all observations from 1998:10 to 1999:1 (the Russian crisis), and from
2000:9 to 2003:4. As we would expect, the coe±cient on b decreases, from 0.32 to
0.16 in the ¯rst case, and to 0.15 in the second case.
In what follows, I use a series for p constructed by using an estimated coe±cient
^ b = 0:16. (Results below are largely una®ected if I use one of the other values for
^ b in Table 1 instead.) Figure 5 shows the evolution of the EMBI spread, and the
constructed series for p. The two series move largely together, except for mean
and amplitude. The main di®erence between the spread and probability series
takes place from early 1999 to early 2002. While the spread increases slightly, the
increase is largely attributed to the increase in risk aversion, and the estimated
probability of default decreases slightly during the period.
[Figure 5. The evolution of the EMBI spread, and the estimated probability of
default.]
2.2 Estimating the capital °ow relation
We can now turn to the estimation of the two relations between the exchange rate
and the probability of default.Figure 5. Spread and estimated probability of default











The ¯rst is the \capital °ow" relation, which gives us the e®ect on the exchange
rate of a change in the probability of default. A good semi-log approximation to
equation (6) is given by:
log ² = a ¡ b(r ¡ r¤) + c (pµ¤) + u² (9)
The real exchange rate between Brazil and the United States is a decreasing func-
tion of the real interest di®erential, and a decreasing function of the risk premium|
the product of the probability of default times the degree of risk aversion of foreign
investors. The error term captures all other factors.
That there is a strong relation between the risk premium and the real exchange
rate is shown in Figure 6, which plots the real exchange rate against the risk
premium for the period 1999:1 to 2004:1 (the period of in°ation targeting and
°oating exchange rate). The real exchange rate is constructed using the nominal
exchange rate and the two CPI de°ators. The risk premium is constructed by
multiplying estimated p and µ¤ from the previous subsection. (Using the EMBI
spread instead of pµ¤ would give a very similar picture). The two series move
surprisingly together.
[Figure 6. The real exchange rate and the risk premium]
Turning to estimation, I estimate two di®erent speci¯cations of equation (9). The
¯rst uses the nominal exchange rate and nominal interest rates; the second uses the
real exchange rate and real interest rates. The only justi¯cation for the nominal
speci¯cation is that it involves less data manipulation (no need to choose between
de°ators, or to construct series for expected in°ation to get real interest rates).7
Results using the nominal speci¯cation are presented in the top part of Table 2. The
nominal exchange rate is the average exchange rate over the month. The nominal
7. Capital °ows can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate and real interest rates,
or as a function of the nominal exchange rate and nominal interest rates. But the trade balance
is a function of the real exchange rate. Thus, the nominal speci¯cation is, stricto sensu, incorrect.Figure 6. Real exchange rate and risk premium
1999:1 to 2004:1
















interest rate di®erential is constructed as the di®erence between the average Selic
rate and the average federal funds rate over the month, both measured at annual
rates.
Table 2. Estimating the capital °ow relation
loge (i ¡ i¤) pµ¤ DW ½ R2
1 OLS 0.73 (1.8) 15.35 (6.1) 0.05 0.43
2 AR1 -0.21 (-0.9) 12.43 (13.1) 0.99 0.98
3 IV AR1 0.74 (1.3) 10.99 (2.4) 0.99 0.97
log² (r ¡ r¤) pµ¤
4 OLS -0.05 (-0.2) 14.08 (11.6) 0.15 0.70
5 AR1 -0.08 (-0.4) 12.41 (12.5) 0.94 0.96
6 IV AR1 0.47 (0.6) 9.04 (4.3) 0.72 0.99
Period of estimation: 1999:1 to 2004:1. Instruments: Current and one-lagged value
of the federal funds rate and of the Baa spread.
Line 1 gives OLS results. The risk premium is highly signi¯cant; the interest rate
di®erential is wrong signed and insigni¯cant. The residual has high serial correla-
tion. Thus, line 2 gives results of estimation with an AR(1) correction. The risk
premium remains highly signi¯cant; the interest di®erential is correctly signed, but
insigni¯cant.
Factors left in the error term may however a®ect p and by implication pµ and, to the
extent that the central bank targets in°ation, may also a®ect i. To eliminate this
simultaneity bias, there are two natural instruments. The ¯rst is the U.S. federal
funds rate, i¤, which should be a good instrument for the interest di®erential; the
second is the foreign investors' degree of risk aversion, µ¤ (the Baa spread), whichBrazil 23
should be a good instrument for pµ¤.8 Events in Brazil are unlikely to have much
e®ect on either of the two instruments. Line 3 presents the results of estimation
using current and one lagged values of each of the two instruments. The risk
premium remains highly signi¯cant. The interest rate di®erential remains wrong
signed.
Results using the real speci¯cation are given in the bottom part of Table 2. The
real exchange rate is constructed using CPI de°ators. The real interest rate for
the United States is constructed by using the realized CPI in°ation rate over the
previous six months as a measure of expected in°ation. For Brazil, I constructed
two di®erent series. The ¯rst was constructed in the same way as for the United
States. The second uses the fact that, since January 2000, the Brazilian Central
Bank has constructed a daily forecast for in°ation over the next 12 months, based
on the mean of daily forecasts of a number of economists and ¯nancial market
participants. These forecasts can di®er markedly from lagged in°ation; this was
indeed the case in the wake of the large depreciation of the Real in 2002. In°ation
forecasts took into account the prospective e®ects of the depreciation on in°ation,
something that retrospective measures obviously miss. Thus, the second series is
constructed using the retrospective measure of in°ation until December 1999, and
the monthly average of the in°ation forecast for each month after December 1999.
The results of estimation using either of the two measures for expected in°ation
in Brazil are su±ciently similar that I present only the results using the second
series in Table 2.
Results from lines 4 to 6 are rather similar to those in lines 1 to 3. The risk
premium is highly signi¯cant. The interest rate di®erential is correctly signed but
insigni¯cant in the ¯rst two lines, wrong signed and insigni¯cant in the last line.
Given the importance of the sign and the magnitude of the direct interest rate
e®ect on the exchange rate, I have explored further whether these insigni¯cance
results for the interest di®erential were robust to alternative speci¯cations, richer
8. Note that p and µ
¤ are uncorrelated by construction. But pµ
¤ and µ
¤ are correlated.Brazil 24
lag structures for the variables, or the use of other instruments. The answer is that
they appear to be. Once one controls for the risk premium, it is hard to detect a
consistent e®ect of the di®erential on the exchange rate.
The speci¯cation in equation (9) re°ects however the theoretical shortcut taken
earlier, which assumed that movements in the expected exchange rate are a con-
stant elasticity function of movements in the current exchange rate. I have also
explored a speci¯cation that does not make this assumption, and allows the ex-
change rate to depend on the expected exchange rate:
log(²) = a + d E[log²0] ¡ b(r ¡ r¤) + c(pµ¤) + u² (10)
This equation can be estimated using the realized value of ²0 and using the same
instruments as before, as they also belong to the information set at time t. The
empirical problem is the usual problem of obtaining precise estimates of d versus
the degree of serial correlation of the error term. To get around this problem,
I present, in Figure 7, the coe±cients on the interest di®erential and the risk
premium conditional on values of d ranging from 0.8 to 1.0. For each value of d,
estimation is carried out, using the real speci¯cation, with an AR(1) correction
and the list of instruments listed earlier. The bands are two-standard-deviation
bands. The future exchange rate is taken to be the exchange rate six months
ahead. (Using the exchange rate from one month to nine months ahead makes
little di®erence to the results. Using the exchange rate more than nine months
ahead eliminates some of the months corresponding to the crisis, and thus loses a
lot of the information in the sample.) The ¯gure reports the results of estimation
using the nominal exchange rate and nominal interest rate speci¯cation; results
using the real speci¯cation are largely similar.
[Figure 7. Estimated e®ects of the risk premium and the interest rate di®erential



























































































































































































































































































































































The lesson from the ¯gure is that the coe±cient on the risk premium remains con-
sistently positive. The coe±cient on the interest di®erential is consistently wrong-
signed.
In short, the empirical evidence strongly supports the ¯rst central link in our
theoretical argument, the e®ect of the probability of default on the exchange rate.
In contrast (and as is often the case in the estimation of interest parity conditions),
there is little empirical support for the conventional e®ect of the interest rate
di®erential e®ect on the exchange rate.
2.3 Estimating the default risk relation
The second relation we need to estimate is the \default risk" relation, which gives
the probability of default as a function of the expected level of debt, which itself
depends on the exchange rate, the interest rate, and the current level of debt,
among other factors.
The relation we need to estimate is:
p = Ã(ED0) + up (11)
where, in contrast to the theoretical model, we need to recognize the fact that
next-period debt is uncertain even in the absence of default, and there may be
shifts in the threshold (for example a lower threshold if a leftist government is
elected), which are captured here by up.
The theory suggests assuming a distribution for the distance of next-period debt
from the threshold, and using it to parameterize Ã(:). I have not explored this, as
I believe there is not enough variation in the debt-GDP ratio over the sample to
allow us to estimate the position of the cumulative distribution function Ã function
precisely). So I specify and estimate a linear relation:
p = Ã ED0 + upBrazil 26












This equation does not need however to be estimated.
In estimating equation (11), I consider three di®erent proxies for ED0:
² The ¯rst is simply D, the current level of the net debt-GDP ratio.
That there is a strong relation between D and p is shown in Figure 8, which
plots the estimated probability of default p, against the current debt-GDP
ratio, for the period 1990:1 to 2004:1.
That expectations of future debt matter beyond the current level of debt
is also made clear however by the partial breakdown of the relation during
the second half of 2003. Debt has stabilized, but had not decreased further.
In contrast, the estimated probability of default, has continued to decrease.
From what we know about that period, the likely explanation seems to be
the growing belief by ¯nancial markets that structural reforms, together
with a steady decrease in the proportion of dollar debt9, implied a better
long run ¯scal situation than was suggested by the current evolution of
debt. For this reason, I explore two alternative measure of ED0:
[Figure 8. The relation of the estimated probability of default to the debt-GDP
ratio]
² The ¯rst measure of ED0 is the mean forecast of the debt-GDP ratio one
year ahead. Since January 2000, the Brazilian Central Bank has collected
daily forecasts of the debt ratio for the end of the current year and for
the end of the following year. Using average forecasts over the month, I
construct one-year ahead forecasts of the ratio by using the appropriate
9. The proportion of dollar debt, net of swap positions, has decreased from 37% in December
2002 to 21% in January 2004.Figure 8. Debt to GDP ratio and p of default
1999:1 to 2003:5



















weights on the current and the following end-of-year forecasts. For example
the one-year ahead forecast as of February 2000 is constructed as 10/12
times the forecast for debt at the end of 2000, plus 2/12 times the forecast
for debt at the end of 2001. (It turns out that, during 2003, this measure
of expected debt does not move very di®erently from current debt, and so
still does not explain the decrease in p during the second half of 2003. A
forecast of debt many years ahead might do better, but such a time series
does not exist.)
² The second measure of ED0 is the realized value of the debt-GDP six months
ahead, instrumented by variables in the information set at time t. The
results are largely similar if I use realized values from one to nine months
ahead. (As for exchange rates earlier, using values more than nine months
ahead eliminates important crisis months from the sample.) I shall discuss
instruments below.
The results of estimation are given in Table 3.
Lines 1 and 2 report the results of OLS regressions, using either current or forecast
debt. They con¯rm the visual impression of a strong relation between debt and
the probability of default. There is evidence of high serial correlation, so lines 3
and 4 report AR(1) results. The relation becomes stronger when current debt is
used, weaker when forecast debt is used.
OLS and AR(1) results are likely however to su®er from simultaneity bias. Any
factor other than debt that a®ects the probability of default will in turn a®ect
expected debt. For example, ¯nancial markets may have concluded that the election
of Lula would both lead to higher debt, and a higher probability of default at a
given level of debt. A natural instrument here is again the Baa spread, which
a®ects expected debt, but is unlikely to be a®ected by what happens in Brazil.10
The same instrument can be used when using the realized value of debt six months
10. The reader may wonder how the Baa spread can be used as an instrument in both the capital
°ow and the default risk equations. It is because it enters multiplicatively (as µ
¤ in pµ
¤) in the
capital °ow equation, and can therefore be used as an instrument for pµ
¤ in that equation.Brazil 28
ahead (the third measure of debt I consider), as it is in the information set at time
t. The next six lines report results of estimation using the current and four lagged
values of the Baa spread as instruments.
Table 3. Estimating the default risk relation
p on D D0 forecast D0 actual DW ½ R2
1 OLS 0.15 (3.4) 0.23 0.15
2 OLS 0.18 (3.7) 0.41 0.21
3 AR1 0.42 (10.4) 0.99 0.89
4 AR1 0.02 (0.2) 0.86 0.75
5 IV 0.23 (3.4) 0.17 0.11
6 IV 0.23 (3.8) 0.41 0.18
7 IV 0.21 (3.1) 0.48 0.02
8 IV AR1 0.38 (3.4) 0.98 0.88
9 IV AR1 0.22 (0.8) 0.96 0.73
10 IV AR1 -0.28 (-1.4) 0.97 0.65
Period of estimation: 1999:1 to 2004:1. Instruments: Current and four lagged values
of the Baa spread.
Lines 5 to 7 report the results of IV estimation, without an AR correction. The
coe±cients are largely similar across the three measures of debt, and signi¯cant.
Lines 8 to 10 give the results of IV estimation, with an AR(1) correction. The
results using the ¯rst two measures of debt are roughly unchanged by the AR(1)
correction. The result of estimation using six months ahead debt (instrumented)
give a negative and insigni¯cant coe±cient. It is the only negative coe±cient in
the table.Brazil 29
In short, the empirical evidence strongly supports the other central link in the
theoretical model, the link from expected debt to the probability of default. This
in turn implies that any factor which a®ects expected debt, from the interest rate
to the exchange rate, to the initial level of debt, a®ects the probability of default.
2.4 Putting things together
Given our two estimated relations, we can determine whether and when an increase
in the domestic interest rate will lead to an appreciation|through the conventional
interest rate channel|or, instead, to a depreciation|through its e®ect on the
probability of default.
In a way, we already have the answer, at least as to the sign. In most of the
speci¯cations of the capital °ow relation, we found the e®ect of the interest rate
di®erential to be either wrong signed, or correctly signed but insigni¯cant. If this
is the case, only the second channel remains, and an increase in the interest rate
will always lead to a depreciation...
So, to give a chance to both channels, I use, for the capital °ow equation, the
speci¯cation which gives the strongest correctly signed e®ect of the interest rate
on the exchange rate, line 2 of Table 2:
log² = constant ¡ 0:21(r ¡ r¤) + 12:43 (µ¤p)
For the default risk equation, I use line 6 of Table 3, which is representative of the
results in the table:
p = constant + 0:23 ED0
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² The direct e®ect of an increase in the interest rate on the exchange rate is
given by the coe±cient on (r ¡ r¤). Thus, given the probability of default,
an increase in the Selic of 100 basis points leads to an appreciation of 21
basis points.
² The increase in the interest rate however also leads to an increase in ex-
pected debt, and thus to an increase in the probability of default, which
leads to a depreciation.
The strength of this indirect e®ect depends on the risk aversion of foreign
investors, µ¤; the initial debt-GDP ratio, D, and its composition, ¹; the
relation between the market and foreign investors' risk aversion, ¸.
For the ¯rst three parameters, I use as benchmark values the average values
of these three variables for the period 1999:1 to 2004:1: D = 0:53; ¹ = 0:50,
and µ¤ = 0:56. For the last, I use a value of ¸ = 0:50 (While one may choose
a di®erent value, it turns out that the speci¯c value of ¸ does not have much
e®ect on the results.)
Under these assumptions, the equations above imply an indirect e®ect on
the exchange rate of 279 basis points. The net e®ect of an increase in the
interest rate of 100 basis points is therefore to lead to a depreciation of 258
basis points.
Table 4. E®ects of an increase in the Selic of 1 percentage point on the
exchange rate, for di®erent values of D;¹ and µ¤
¢log² (%) ¢log² (%) ¢log² (%)
D = 0.13 0.00 ¹ = 0:00 0.91 µ¤ = 0:10 -0.03
D = 0.33 0.59 ¹ = 0:30 1.48 µ¤ = 0:20 0.22
D = 0:53 2.58 ¹ = 0:50 2.58 µ¤ = 0:56 2.58
D = 0.63 8.57 ¹ = 0:70 12.11 µ¤ = 0:80 21.2Brazil 31
Table 4 gives a sense of the sensitivity of the e®ect to values of D; ¹ and µ¤.
Benchmark values are boldfaced.
² The ¯rst set of columns show the e®ects of di®erent initial debt levels (keep-
ing the other parameters equal to their benchmark values)
For debt-GDP ratios of 13%, the e®ect of an increase in the interest rate on
the exchange rate is roughly equal to zero: The direct and indirect e®ects
roughly cancel. The indirect e®ect rapidly increases with the debt ratio.
With a debt ratio of 63%, the e®ect of a one percentage point in the in-
terest rate is a depreciation of 8.57%. For debt ratios above 70%, we are
in the case discussed in the theoretical section, where there is no longer
an equilibrium. The interactions between the probability of default and the
debt are too strong. (This may explain the high volatility in the EMBI and
the nervousness of foreign investors in 2002.)
² The next two columns show the e®ects of di®erent proportions of dollar-
denominated debt (keeping the other parameters equal to their benchmark
value). With no dollar-denominated debt, the exchange rate barely moves
in response to the interest rate. As the proportion increases however, the
e®ect increases rapidly. For ¹ = 0:7, the depreciation reaches 12.11%. And
for values above 0.8, there is no longer an equilibrium. The fact that the
Brazilian government has steadily reduced ¹ in 2003 may help explain why
the estimated probability of default decreased steadily while the level of
debt remained relatively high.
² The last two columns show the e®ect of di®erent degrees of risk aversion
on the part of foreign investors. For low risk aversion, the exchange rate
actually appreciates, but by very little. But, again, as the degree of risk
aversion increases, the exchange rate depreciates. As risk aversion reaches
0.8, the depreciation reaches 21.2%. And for risk aversion slightly higher
than 0.8, the equilibrium again disappears.Brazil 32
3 Conclusions and extensions
The model and the empirical work presented in this paper yield a clear conclusion.
When ¯scal conditions are wrong|i.e. when debt is high, when a high proportion
of debt is denominated in foreign currency, when the risk aversion of investors is
high{an increase in the interest rate is more likely to lead to a depreciation than to
an appreciation. And ¯scal conditions were indeed probably wrong, in this speci¯c
sense, in Brazil in 2002.
The limits of the argument should be clear as well. To go from this model and
these conclusions to a characterization of optimal monetary and ¯scal policy in
such an environment requires a number of additional steps:
² The model should be made dynamic. The same basic mechanisms will be
at work. But this will allow for a more accurate mapping from the model
to the data. In a dynamic model, the probability of default will depend on
the distribution of the future path of debt, not just \next-period debt".
² The model needs to be nested in a model with an explicit treatment of
nominal rigidities. This is needed for two reasons: To justify the assumption
that the central bank has indeed control of the real interest rate; and to
derive the e®ect of changes in the real exchange rate on in°ation.
² The model focused on the e®ects of the interest rate on in°ation through
the real exchange rate. There is obviously another and more conventional
channel through which an increase in the interest rate a®ects in°ation,
namely through the e®ect of the interest rate on demand, output, and in
turn, in°ation.
When and whether this second channel dominates the ¯rst is an empirical
issue. I speculate that, in the case of Brazil, this second channel may not
be very strong. The safe real interest rate has been very high over the last
three or four years, remaining consistently above 10%. The real rate at
which ¯rms and consumers can borrow has been much higher than the safe
real rate, averaging 30 to 40% over the same period. At that rate, few ¯rms
and consumers borrow, and the demand from those who borrow may not beBrazil 33
very elastic. In e®ect, the main borrower in the economy is the government,
and the e®ect of the interest rate may fall primarily on ¯scal dynamics. The
issue however can only be settled by extending the model and estimating
the strength of the di®erent channels.
Turning to another set of issues: The paper has not characterized the monetary
policy which was actually followed in Brazil in 2002-2003... While not central to
the argument developed in this paper|which is about a mechanism rather than
an episode|this is of interest in itself, and it helps to understand the behavior of
a central bank in such an environment.
To give a sense of policy during that period, and given that the main instrument
of monetary policy is the Selic rate, Figure 9 plots forecast in°ation and the real
interest rate over the period 2002:1 2004:1. Forecast in°ation is the mean forecast
of CPI in°ation over the following 12 months, described earlier. The real interest
rate is constructed by subtracting forecast in°ation from the Selic rate.
The ¯gure tells a clear story. Until september 2002, forecast in°ation remained
low, and the Central Bank continued its policy of allowing for a slow decrease in
the Selic rate, both nominal and real. As the currency depreciated further and
forecast in°ation increased, the Central Bank increased the Selic rate, ¯rst in
October (before the elections), and then again in November and December. These
increases were smaller however than the increase in the in°ation forecast, leading
to a further small decline in the real interest rate. This changed, starting in early
2003. Troughout the ¯rst half of the year, increases in the Selic combined with a
steady decrease in the in°ation forecast combined to lead to a large increase in the
real interest rate, from 10% in late 2002 to 18% in mid-2003. Since then, decreases
in the Selic have led to a steady decrease in the real interest rate, which is now
close to 10%, its 2002 low.
Why did the Central Bank allow for a decrease in the real rate until the end of 2002,
before increasing the real rate strongly during the ¯rst half of 2003? The rationale
explored in this paper, the e®ect of higher real rates on ¯scal dynamics, may haveFigure 9. Forecast inflation, and real interest rate
2002:1 to 2004:1













played a role. The reluctance to take an unpopular measure in the middle of an
electoral campaign may have been another factor|although the ¯rst increase in
the Selic took place before the election. The rationale given by the Central Bank
itself is its initial belief that in°ation would turn around faster, and its subsequent
realization that tighter monetary policy was needed to achieve lower in°ation in
2003 (Banco Central do Brazil, 2003).
Whatever the reasons, it is therefore the case that, in contrast to the conceptual
experiment discussed in the paper, monetary policy did not lead to a higher real in-
terest rate in 2002. By the time the real interest rate was indeed increased, in 2003,
the commitment to ¯scal austerity by the new government probably dominated any
potentially perverse e®ects of higher real interest rates on debt dynamics.Brazil 35
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